The idea of symmetric stability of symmetric equilibria is introduced, which is relevant, e.g., for the comparative-statics of symmetric equilibria given symmetric shocks. I show that symmetric stability can be expressed in a two-player reduced-form version of the game, derive an elementary relation between symmetric stability and the existence of exactly one symmetric equilibrium and apply symmetric stability to a two-dimensional N -player contest.
Symmetric Games
I consider games of N ≥ 2 players. x g ≡ (x g1 , ..., x gk ) ∈ S(k) is a strategy of player g, where S ≡ S(k) = × k i=1 S i with S i = 0,S i ⊂ R,S i > 0, and interior Int(S i ). All players have identical strategy space. The payoff of g is represented by a C 2 function Π g (x 1 , ..., x g , ..., x N ) ≡ Π (x g , x −g ), which is strongly quasiconcave 2 in x g . All players have identical payoffs: Π g (x 1 , ..., x g , ..., x N ) = Π σ(g) x σ(1) , ..., x σ(g) , ..., x σ(N )
1 There are numerous examples, such as Salop (1979) , Grossman and Shapiro (1984) , Dixit (1986) or recently Hefti (2015) .
2 Meaning: z · z = 1, z ·
∂xg∂xg z < 0 (see Avriel et al. (1981) ).
a symmetric equilibrium always exists and the set of symmetric equilibria is compact (Hefti (2014) ).
Symmeric stability
I mostly restrict attention to the system of gradient dynamics
where S is a k × k positive-diagonal adjustment matrix, and
. A solution to
(1) has the form x(t) = (x j (t)) 1≤j≤N , where x j (t) = (x j1 (t), ..., x jk (t)) is the trajectory of j. I consider a restricted version of this trajectory map, where initial values x(0) are symmetric,
i.e. x 1 (0) = ... = x N (0). Then, by symmetry, x j (t) is the same for all players and solveṡ
I say that an interior symmetric equilibrium x * is symmetrically stable if the dynamics induced by (2) converge to x * whenever x(0) is close to x * . 5 Hence:
Definition 1 (Symmetric stability) The symmetric equilibrium x * ∈ Int(S) is symmetrically stable if all eigenvalues ofĴ(x * 1 ), the Jacobian corresponding to (2), have negative real 3 Despite symmetry, payoffs can become cumbersome in applications, in particular in the higher-dimensional case or if strategies do not enter payoffs in an aggregative way (see Hefti (2015) for an illustrative example).
4 This is a standard dynamics, see e.g. Dixit (1986) ; Vives (1999) ; Dastidar (2000) ; Okuguchi and Yamazaki (2008) .
5 Equivalently, x * is symmetrically stable if the dynamics (1) converge to x * for any symmetric starting point close enough to x * .
parts.
x * is symmetrically unstable if at least one eigenvalue ofĴ(x * 1 ) has positive real part. Stability of (1) implies symmetric stability, but not vice-versa (figure 1).
, ,
Figure 1: Stable (left) and only symmetrically stable (right)
Let Cr s = {x 1 ∈ S : ∇Π (x 1 ) = 0}, and note that ∇Π (x 1 ) :
vector field with k×k JacobianJ(x 1 ). A symmetric game is (symmetrically) regular if i) ∇Π has only regular zeroes 6 and ii) ∇Π points inwards at the boundary of S. Any reference to a regular game in this article refers to "symmetrically regular", which is a weaker condition than general regularity of a symmetric game (see Hefti (2014) ). The first theorem below reveals the general connection between symmetric stability and the existence of a single symmetric equilibrium, depending on the dimensionality of the strategy space. Its proof exploits an essential relation betweenĴ,J andφ.
Proof: The first equality is immediate. Next, decomposeJ(x 1 ) =
By the Implicit Function Theorem (IFT) ∂φ(x 1 ) =
|x =x 1 which, to-
gether with the decomposition ofJ gives the second equality.
, 1 ≤ α, β ≤ k, where ∇ aΠ is the α-th projection of ∇Π.
Theorem 1 (i) If k = 1 then x * is a symmetrically stable equilibrium ifΠ 11 (x * 1 ) < 0 or equivalently ifφ (x * 1 ) < 1.
(ii) For k = 2 a symmetric equilibrium x * is symmetrically stable if −J(x It follows from (iii) that if each x 1 ∈ Cr s verifies symmetric stability then exactly one symmetric equilibrium exists. 8 In the one-dimensional case an even stronger relation between symmetric stability and the number of symmetric equilibria applies:
9
Corollary 1 Let k = 1 in a regular game. There exists an odd number of symmetrically stable equilibria. Moreover, a symmetric equilibrium is globally symmetrically stable iff x * is the only symmetric equilibrium.
7 See Vives (1999) . 8 If all eigenvalues ofĴ(x 1 ) have negative real parts, then Det(−Ĵ(x 1 )) > 0 and by (3) also Det(−J(x 1 )) > 0. Thus every x 1 ∈ Cr s has index +1, which by the index theorem implies existence of a unique symmetric equilibrium. This type of relation between the index of certain vector fields and stability conditions is known in other settings (see Hefti (2016) and the references therein).
9 The claims in corollary 1 are generally restricted to k = 1. Best-reply dynamics Another standard dynamics in the literature are dynamics defined directly over the best-reply functions. 10 These dynamics are of the forṁ
10 See e.g. Hahn (1962) , Al Nowaihi and Levine (1985) , Vives (1999) , Dindos and Mezzetti (2006) . and the symmetric restriction analogously to (2) yieldṡ
(index −1). Consider a symmetric parameter shift c → c and assume thatφ(x, c ) >φ(x, c).
As is suggested by the figure (formally we would apply the IFT) points A and B both increase to A and B . As both A and B are symmetrically stable, the symmetric dynamics (2) converge from A to A or from B to B , consistent with the suggested shift ofφ. For the symmetrically unstable point C we see that C < C (a consequence of the negative index), contradicting the direction suggested byφ(x, c ) >φ(x, c). As C lies in the basin of attraction of B the dynamics do not move down to C but monotonically up to B (which is also inconsistent with "small" changes). Hence the comparative-statics suggested by the IFT and the dynamics disagree at the unstable equilibria, and the IFT-prediction C → C could never be supported as a stable equilibrium.
11 It can be noted occasionally from the figure that strong quasiconcavity is generally indispensable for corollary 1 to apply with the gradient dynamics, but not with (4).
12 A well-known exception are supermodular games (see Vives (1999) ). To illustrate symmetric stability, and its usefulness, consider a payoff of the form
The interpretation is that N contestants choose their strategies, the pairs (f j , p j ), to obtain a prize worth V (·), where the value of a prize is endogenously determined. A specific context is provided by Hefti (2015) , where firms compete in salience and prices for attention-constrained consumers.
13 Assume that C (f ) > 0, C (f ) ≤ 0 and π(f, f ) > 0 (everybody has a chance to seize a prize) for f > 0, and V (p, p) > 0 (a prize is worthwhile seizing) for p > 0. An interior
with associated Jacobiañ
13 (5) is compatible with multiple prizes.
It easily follows from theorem 1 (ii) that (p, f ) is symmetrically stable if bothΠ pp ,Π f f < 0. By contrast, with dynamics (1) we would need to evaluate the eigenvalues of a N k × N k matrix.
The symmetric stability condition states that second-order direct effects of each own strategy p, f (which must be negative by strong quasiconcavity) are not reversed by the second-order effects of (p,f ), a property which is typically satisfied in standard functional examples (see Hefti (2015) ). Moreover, it follows from theorem 1 (iii) that if any (p, f ) ∈ Cr s verifies this condition and the game is symmetrically regular, a single symmetric and symmetrically stable equilibrium exists.
